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1. Introduction 
In 1991 Mark Eyskens, Belgium’s Foreign Minister, made the rightly famous statement that 
‘Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm’. Not much has changed 
since then. At the moment, Europe is the second largest economy in the world (CIA, 2017), 
The Union’s political influence is negligible on the global scale, and its military ambitions 
remained ambitions. However, these strong ambitions go back until the end of Second World 
War. Whereas Britain has always been obstructing the European defence integration and, in 
more general, the European project, actually many consider Winston Churchill, a former British 
Prime-Minister during the Second World War, as the inventor of the modern idea of the 
European Army when he said that: 
 
“here must be created, and in the shortest possible time, a real defensive front in 
Europe. Great Britain and United States must send large forces to the Continent. I 
have already made my appeal to Germany. France must again revive her famous 
army… All…must bear their share and do their best… we should make a gesture 
of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favour of the 
immediate creation of a European army under a unified command, and in which we 
should all bear a worthy and honourable part. Therefore…I beg to move that: The 
Assembly…calls for the immediate creation of a unified European army subject to 
proper European democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United 
States and Canada” (Kasonta, 2015). 
 
Decades-long struggle followed Churchill’s words which involved the Pleven Plan, the 
biggest defence proposal and failure, in European history, five wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria to which the Union was unable to react on its own or at 
all, numerous smaller defence proposals and initiatives, such as the Western European Union, 
the Petersburg Tasks, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Helsinki Headline, the Berlin Plus agreement; which 
all have very limited success. Renaming the ESDP from European to Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) can be recognised as another bad sign. However, the idea of the 
European Army has never died. 
 (European Commission, 2015, p. 7) 
 
The latest resurgence of the European Army idea was in 2015 when Jean-Claude 
Juncker, President of the European Commission, said that: “An army like this would help 
us to better coordinate our foreign and defense policies, and to collectively take on Europe's 
responsibilities in the world” (Kasonta, 2015). Which is undoubtedly true, but history 
shows that the European defence integration is not an easily achievable goal. First of all, 
defence matters are one of the core elements of sovereignty, and none of the twenty-eight 
Member States (MSs) are willing to give it up. Although this argument in its simplicity is, 
of course, true, the issue of the lack of proper European defence integration is a much more 
complex than that. The European integration on defence matters is blocked by NATO-
reflexes, different strategic cultures and the lack of military market integration, but due to 
the current global developments, it could gain a considerable momentum. 
The methodology of the paper is based on analysis of previous scholarly works and 
official papers with a political and historical approach. Moreover, the structure of the paper 
is the following: in Chapter two, I will present the on-going debate revolving around the 
European Army, showing both the pro- and anti-side, and provide a summary of the most 
important actors, institutions, concepts and mechanism of CSDP. Chapter three will give a 
detailed assessment of the previously identified obstacles, i.e. NATO-reflexes, the different 
European strategic cultures and the lack of military market integration. Chapter four goes 
on and contemplates on how the ‘Brexit’, Trump’s election as the President of the United 
States and other geopolitical developments affect and influence the Union and more 
specifically the CSDP. It also provides a short evaluation on how the European military 
integration could move forward. 
 
2. The Progress of the CSDP So Far 
2.1. ‘Do We Need a European Defence Policy?’ – The Debate Around the CSDP 
The European Defence Policy has been slowly moving forward to achieving more cooperation 
since 1950, during which the contentious question of ‘do we need it?’ rekindles time and time 
again. What is as actual and lively debated as it was decades ago. There are two main camps 
divided on this question, a firm approval and a firm rejection, who cannot seem to be reconciled 
with each other. 
Jan Techau (2015) refers to the two groups as Atlanticists and Gaullists. The former 
represents the no side, and the latter stands for the yes wanting more independence from the 
US. He argues that the Atlanticists have already won the debate because the supreme actor in 
European security is not the EU Member States (MSs), but the US who deters any threat with 
its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, even if the Union embarked on creating its own efficient military 
capabilities, it would be dangerous to pursue its goals without the approval of the US. Firstly, 
they cannot take responsibility for independent Union actions; secondly, the Union will never 
have the same nuclear deterrence power. Sten Rynning’s (2005) line of thought revolves around 
the same idea. His main argument is that the Union has not developed an adequate strategic 
culture and never will because the Union is inevitably a pluralist construction that will never 
acquire complete political unity and a sense of purpose. Moreover, this construction will 
become fragmented politically, if the Union counters the national decision-making on a 
sensitive sovereignty matter. He concludes that the Union was intended to be a peace project 
and it should remain this way, because the fragmentation can mean the end of the European 
project, and also that defence policy ambitions should be left to those who have the capacity to 
behave in such a way. Altough, Jan Zielonka (2015) admits that the Union can help its MSs to 
rationalise their defence spending, improve their cooperation and planning, and even to 
integrate armies, but he thinks that it should not lead to the creation of a supranational European 
army. Firstly, he cannot see that who would give their lives for the Union and what ambitions 
could be achieved by it, because the peace-keeping missions are already successful and Russia 
cannot be deterred without nuclear weapons. Secondly, Zielonka argues that it is more 
advantageous for the Union to be a civilian power than that of a military. That way the Union, 
for instance, managed its enlargement to the East without Russia seeing it as a military threat 
and the military power status would bring great responsibility to the Union for which it is not 
ready – yet as some would add. 
Although the Gaullists, or the yes side, agrees on that we need a common or at least 
more cooperation on the defence policy; they also admit that at the moment achieving it is 
beyond the capabilities of the Union and there is a long road ahead of us with hard and difficult 
choices. Anand Menon (2015) mentions that while little progress has been made with the 
European army, which is regarded as a born dead idea by the Atlantisicts, it seems remarkably 
resilient as it is still on the agenda after 70 years and many failed attempts. He has two main 
reasons for the (yet) unachieved European Army. Firstly, the NATO, aka the US, is still doing 
the heavy lifting. Secondly, the European military market is inefficient which is rooted in the 
stubborn assumption that national budgets must be spent on a domestic level without any 
collaboration among the MSs. On the one hand, armies are the core element of sovereignty, but 
on the other hand, that way the European military market cannot benefit from economies of 
scale.  At the same time, Tomáš Weiss (2016) points out that the European military decision-
making is working basically on an ad-hoc basis. He argues that this a consequence of deeper 
problems at national levels which are the shrinking defence budgets and its inefficient spending 
and the poorly organised defence sector. Biava, Drent and Herd (2011) argues that the Union 
can become a military power due to the fact there are successful CSDP missions where the 
Union used military force to achieve political objectives. Therefore, they say that the question 
is not whether the Union can become a military power or not, but how it will realise its potential 
in the future based on the magnitude, frequency and purpose of its missions. 
 
2.2. The Current State of the CSDP 
Although, it seems like the Union has not made much progress in the field of CSDP, as a matter 
of fact nowadays the Union has more than ever before, but it is also important to mention that 
they often do not meet the expectations. 
The Union’s common defence and military ambitions are encoded in the Treaty on 
European Union (2009). Firstly, Article 24(1) allows for creating policies that could lead to a 
European Army. That phrase is never actually used, but they refer to it as a common defence 
which is only vaguely defined. Article 42(1) states that the CSDP will be an integral part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and it will provide operational capacity drawing on 
civilian and military assets. In the case of armed aggression on one of the MSs Article 42(7) 
calls for a collective defence where MSs obligated to assist each other by all means in their 
power; however, this article also states that NATO remains the foundation of MSs defence. 
Also with the new Treaty, the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (HR) was created. This person holds this position of the 
Commissioner for External Relations and a Vice-President in the Commission. The HR 
conducts and contributes to the CFSP and ensures the implementation of the adopted decisions. 
Also, the HR represents the Union in matters relating to CFSP, maintain communication with 
third parties on the Union’s behalf. The HR unique role and work is assisted by the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) (Article 27(3) TEU), they prepare policy proposals and 
implement them after the approval of the Council. It also works as a network that links the 
Council, the Commission and the MSs, but it has autonomy from these institutions and actors 
(Rehrl, Weisserth, 2013). 
Another important agency in the field of CSDP is European Defence Agency (EDA) 
which was established in 2004 under joint Council initiative (EDA is based on Articles 42(3) 
and 45 TEU). EDA is under the control of the Council, and the Head of the Agency is the HR. 
The agency’s decision-making body is the Steering Board which is composed of the twenty-six 
Defence Ministers1 of the MS and the Head of Agency (HR). Moreover, EDA has four main 
tasks: 1. Enhance defence capabilities; 2. Promotion of Defence research and technology; 3. 
Promotion of military cooperation; 4. Creation of a European Defence Equipment Market. The 
general objectives of these tasks can be summarised as a more integrated approach that pushes 
for more cooperation which will result in an industrial restructuring and a continental-wide 
demand and supply market (Rehrl, Weisserth, 2013). 
Another important ingredient of the CSDP is the battlegroups. The Battlegroup Concept 
is relatively new as it was agreed on in 2004 and by 2007 it reached its full operational 
capability. A Battlegroups is a small battalion-sized force with combat support with 
approximately 1500 personnel. It is an effective, credible, coherent force capable of stand-alone 
operations and most importantly it is rapidly deployable (see the figure below). The 
Battlegroups are on standby for six months, and they should be sustainable for thirty days which 
                                                             
1 This due to the Danish opt-out on defence matters. 
can be extended to hundred and twenty days (European Council, 2009). However, they have 
never been deployed so far. 
 
 
(European Council, 2009, p. 2) 
 
Even though displaying the capabilities of the Battlegroups remain for the future, it does 
not mean that the Union has not taken part in military and civilian operations. As a matter of 
fact, since 2003 the Union launched twenty-nine missions of which eleven is still on-going. 
Operations have been taking place in Africa and Asia (the Middle-East) and Europe (the 
Balkans, Mediterranean Sea). If we leave aside the civilian operations, there are nine military 
and one hybrid mission. Currently, there are five running missions out of the total ten. These 
are EUFOR ALTHEA (since 2004 and this is the hybrid mission as it was originally a NATO 
operation), EUTM Somalia (since 2008), EU NAVFOR Atlanta (since 2010), EUTM Mali 
(since 2013) and EUTM RCA (since 2016) (Giumelli, Cusumano, 2015; European External 
Action Service, 2016). The Union decided to acquire the competence to intervene and sustain 
its presence outside of its borders when its leaders had realised that they are unable to address 
emergencies even in their close neighbourhood after the Kosovo occurred between 1998-1999 
(Giumelli, Cusumano, 2015). These operations started before the Battlegroups Concept; the 
first operation was launched in 2003 under the name of EUFOR Concordia in Macedonia. 
It is also worth mentioning that the military and civilian operations are financed through 
the ATHENA mechanism which was established in 2004 and based on Article 41 TEU which 
forbids the financing of these operations through Union budget. The MSs provide the funds 
which are based on GNI scale. Currently, the contributions are ranging from 0,5% to 20% per 
MS. Thus, it is logical that a Special Committee, composed of representatives of the MSs, 
manages ATHENA by unanimous decisions. Moreover, an administrator and an accounting 
officer are appointed for three years by the Secretary General of the Council. Their task is to 
help the work and functioning of ATHENA (Rehrl, Weisserth, 2013; European Council, 2014). 
 3. The Obstacles in the Path 
3.1. NATO-Reflexes 
NATO was established in 1949 serving as a collective defence organisation for Europe most of 
which protection is provided by the US. The collective defence mechanism is based on Article 
5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that: 
 
“an armed attack against one or more of [the NATO members] in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree 
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them […] will assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, 
such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” 
 
Article 5 is the main reason why Europe has not perceived any direct military threat to its 
territories since the end of the Second World War. NATO allowed for the European nations to 
rebuild their countries in peace which made NATO invaluable for Europe and it still is in the 
21st century. However, the US doing the heavy lifting the resulted in the dismantling of the 
European militaries after the Second World War. This is not a new phenomenon, in 1956 the 
Suez Canal Crisis already showed that the European powers (France and the UK) were unable 
to execute foreign military operations on their own successfully. Since then the situation has 
only been spiralling down. 
Meanwhile, NATO and the US became pivotal parts of the European security, Europe 
does not contribute much to the US defence policy. Some voices in the States argue that the 
rich Europeans can pay for their own security and they do not add much to American firepower 
anyway (Keohane, 2012). Others, such as the newly elected president of the United States, 
Donald Trump, continuously call upon the NATO members that their spending does not reach 
the 2% benchmark. However, this not new, for instance, in 2011 Robert Gates, Secretary of 
Defense during the first Obama administration warned Europe that the post-Cold War 
generation could abandon its European allies if they do not start increasing their military 
spending and consequently their military capabilities (Traynor, 2011). This seems like to 
happen as the economic importance is shifting from West to East and the US is pivoting to Asia 
increasing its powers there while reducing those in Europe (Keohane, 2012; European 
Commission, 2015). 
However, it would be premature to declare that the Union is left alone. There are at least 
three reasons. Firstly, the “security and prosperity of Europe is vital for the [US as] the 
transatlantic economy accounts for half of [the] global GDP and nearly a third of [the] global 
trade” (Keohane, 2012, p. 2). Secondly, Middle-East will remain a key region for the US for 
which Europe serves as a base to project its power. Lastly, the added power of NATO deters 
Russia from any direct attack on NATO members (Keohane, 2012). 
The question arises here: can NATO defeat Russia in an armed conflict? According to the 
simulations of the RAND Corporation “NATO’s current posture is woefully inadequate” 
(Shlapak, 2017, p. 1). The fastest victory of the Russians was achieved in a day and a half, while 
the longest NATO forces were able to stand their grounds was sixty hours. Their estimate is 
that NATO needs  
“seven brigades, including, importantly three armor-heavy brigades—armor 
brigade combat teams (ABCTs), in U.S. Army parlance—in addition to the national 
defense forces of the Baltic states, and properly supported with fires, fixed- and 
rotary-wing aviation, engineering, logistics, and other enablers, and with adequate 
headquarters capacity for planning and command” (Shlapak, 2017, p. 4) 
to hold off the Russian offensive for 28 days on the capitals of Latvia or Estonia. Of course, to 
counterattack and restore the pre-war borders NATO needs another nine to fourteen brigades 
with the proper support and enablers. However, the required force is hardly achievable at the 
moment, because most European NATO armies are unprepared to generate such force on short 
notice (Shlapak, 2017). 
The European military inability to act is also a result of the American policy which is 
called the ‘three Ds’ which stands for decoupling, discrimination and duplication. The term 
itself was introduced by Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State during the Clinton 
administration, in 1998. She argues that we have to avoid these by all means necessary. Firstly, 
NATO is the expression of the transatlantic link, and if Europe goes off its own it will loosen 
the common sense of purpose and interest. Secondly, the unnecessary duplication of NATO 
forces and infrastructure with the limited and declining European security budgets which would 
be everything, but efficient (Kapchan, 2010). Thirdly, Europe cannot discriminate against 
European states that are not EU members. While these American principles and perspective 
have been tying the hands of the Europeans, their fragmented security strategies and visions 
also stand in the way of starting their closer defence cooperation outside of NATO. 
 
3.2. Different National Security Strategic Cultures and Dropping Military Spending 
The most salient difference between the US and the Union regarding defence and security is 
that the US has a common strategic culture, the Union has 28 different national defence 
strategies. The 28 European security strategies come with various objectives and preparedness. 
Not to mention that most of these documents are “incoherent, derivative and devoid of the sense 
of a common European geostrategic situation, and often long out-of-date” (De France, Witney, 
2013, p. 1). It is virtually impossible to harmonise the defence cultures of the MSs while there 
are “28 independent national command structures with the same number of national support 
structures and infrastructure, [and] each of the 28 European armed forces trains in its particular, 
independent way, following national doctrines and idiosyncrasies” (Ballester, 2013, p. 30). 
The following table shows the comprehensiveness and the currency (which is based on 
their publication date) of the European national security strategies. They are put into six 
categories, which are: grand strategists, strategists, globalists, localists, abstentionists and 
drifters. 
 
 
(de France, Witney, 2013, p. 8) 
 
No surprise that France and the UK have the most far-reaching strategies, earning rightly 
so the Grand Strategists title. Given the fact that they were colonial powers not so long ago, 
they retained the ability to think globally and the will to act globally. The French strategy 
assesses the geostrategic trend which is the power shift to the East and decline of the traditional 
Western powers and the growing involvement of non-state actors in security. It identifies risks 
threats and opportunities, and it aims to find the suitable role of the French armed forces. 
Similarly, the British strategy shows what role the UK wants to take on the global stage, but the 
ends and the means are less clear than in the French one. It identifies cyber security and 
terrorism as the two major threats – although their solution involves aircraft carriers for which 
they were criticised. Both strategies realise that the line between internal and external security 
are more and more blurry, if not even relevant anymore. Another commonality is that they wish 
to be able to execute autonomous actions and project force outside the national borders (De 
France, Witney, 2013). 
Although Strategists and Globalists do not reach the level of France and the UK, they 
manage to present some innovative analysis and strategic thinking. However, these strategies 
tend to list risks and threats that feature in EU, NATO and UN documents, and they fall short 
on giving answers of how to react with their armed forces (De France, Witney, 2013). 
The Localists’ main concern is to keep their countries territorial integrity intact to which 
Russia is either named as a threat or as a potential partner – Sweden also identifies Russia as a 
threat. These countries’ strategies usually rely on the leading NATO and EU wisdom, which 
means in practicality that the risks and threats identified by those organisations are added to 
them, but they are not dealt with at all. Moreover, any strategic planning outside of their borders 
involves the NATO and the US (De France, Witney, 2013). 
Lastly, Abstentionists and Drifters are those countries who decided to call off any 
defence and security thinking and strategic planning. Austria, Malta and Luxembourg went to 
such extent that they do not even possess fully-fledged defence ministries. However, those who 
have are not doing any better either: the Greek strategy was published in 1997, Italy’s was in 
2002, but they do publish a yearly report on allocation of resources on defence matters. The 
Belgian and Luxembourgian strategies are just summaries of statements by defence ministers 
and lists of defence laws. Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal have not even translated 
their strategies into English. (De France, Witney, 2013). 
Seeing this state of affairs makes crystal clear that the Union’s MSs cannot decide on a 
single European strategy as long as their security goals are deeply fragmented on the national 
level. While France and the UK want to project power outside of Europe, others do not have 
such high aspirations. On the one hand, the Baltic countries, Poland and Sweden’s main concern 
is to be safe from the potential Russian aggression, on the other hand the Southern and Southern-
Eastern MSs “focus more on the increasing security challenges in North Africa and the Middle 
East” (European Commission, 2015, p. 4). At the same time, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria give up on any military ambition, and the remaining countries 
are more or less just trying to maintain the make-believe. MSs cannot agree on the need for the 
military force and how it should be used until they give up the idea that the European security 
strategy should be based on their national strategy. 
Consequently, the Union is unable to produce a strategy which would serve at least as 
a guideline to the MSs. The European Security Strategy was published in 2003, but it did not 
bring any real impetus to the developments, but it was rightly praised in its time. Although, 
there were attempts on the behalves of the Commission, Parliament and France to revalue the 
European strategy the MSs always secluded the idea since then an unofficial European Global 
Strategy was released in 2013, financed by Italy, Poland, Spain, and Sweden (De France, 
Witney, 2013). However, in 2016 The Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and 
Security Policy was presented by Federica Mogherini, the current HR. It identifies five priorities 
for EU foreign policy, these are: “[1.] the security of the Union; [2.] state and societal resilience 
to the East and South of the EU; [3.] the development of an integrated approach to conflicts; 
[4.] cooperative regional orders; and [5.] global governance for the 21st century” (Legrand, 
2017). Undoubtedly, this is an important development, but it seems like there cannot be a single 
European strategy until the MSs are willing to at least assign some common goals. 
On the top of all that European governments gradually decrease their military budgets, 
while the rest of the world has engaged in an arms race, especially Russia, China and Saud-
Arabia. Nevertheless, the Union is still the second largest military spender2, with €210 billion, 
after the US, with €460 billion,3, but its military strength does not translate anywhere near that 
of the US or Russia. That is due to the lack of common European objective and fragmentation 
of military structure and market. 
 
                                                             
2 Interestingly, the total Asian military spending, roughly €257 billion, already exceeded the Union’s in 2012 
(MacDonald, 2013). 
3 Both in 2014. 
 (European Commission, 2015, p. 3) 
 
3.3. Lack of Military Market Integration 
While the European project gradually broke down the various economic barriers between the 
MSs, the defence markets have remained excluded from the process of integration. MSs have a 
preference for their national markets for procuring defence supplies. Also, they are reluctant to 
give up their strategic industrial base, technology, other information, and a high number of jobs 
which are probably highly specialised. Therefore, the acquisition of defence equipment and 
armaments is profoundly different from purchasing goods from the civil sector. It is 
understandable because security is one of the core elements of sovereignty, has always been a 
sensitive subject since MSs’ defence and freedom depend on it (Briani, 2013). However, how 
is this possible, as in theory the European project should have opened every market within the 
Union? Well, Article 346 TFEU, present and unchanged since the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community (1957), allows for the preservation of information and 
supplies in the security sector. It states that: 
 
“(a) no Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which 
it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security; 
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall 
not adversely affect the conditions of competition in the internal market 
regarding products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.” 
 
Although Article 346 should be only be used in a legitimate case of confidentiality and 
security breach, due to its vague wording calling upon it, MSs can avoid opening up their 
defence market for the Union. This resulted in the fact that there is no European single defence 
market, but twenty-eight national markets (Briani, 2013). 
Consequently, these markets cannot benefit from economies of scale, pooling and sharing 
and R&D and R&T cooperation, at the same time they duplicate (or rather multiple) the military 
structures and HQs which leads to inefficient spending. There are indications that the cost of 
non-Europe in the defence field may cost the Union €120 (more than half of the total budget) 
billion annually (Briani, 2013, Ballester, 2013). 
The differences are eye-catching if we compare the spending and the efficiencies of the 
European and American militaries. According to the Heritage institution’s data, the efficiency 
of the European forces only 15% that of the US. Which would not be a problem if Europeans 
had 15% of the US budget at their disposal. However, Europeans spend €170-210 billion 
annually on their defence which is a little less than half of the American budget, €380-460 
billion. Ideally, this 15% efficiency should come with 15% of the same budget, which would 
be €57-69 billion (Ballester, 2013). 
These numbers are even more shocking if we consider that the US had cut its expenditure 
on military personnel by approximately 35%. Their aim was to create a slimmer, more flexible 
and more deployable army, which was followed by the French and British armies, most of the 
European countries struggle to make the transition from the traditional Cold War armies which 
were focused on static territorial defence to the model of deploying troops abroad. Although, 
their personnel numbers decreased by 40% since 1990, the proportion of expenditure has 
remained on the same level (Ballester, 2013). More than half of the total of European military 
budget is still spent on personnel, while for instance only 20% is spent on Equipment 
Procurement and R&D or R&T. What is more is that since 2006 R&D and R&T funds dropped 
by almost 30% and there is no collaboration on these matters as roughly 90% of these 
investments are single national programmes which are not efficient own their own (European 
Commission, 2015). 
 
 (Ballester, 2013, p. 17)4 
 
 
(European Commission, 2015, p. 4) 
 
While EDA’s task is to enhance the cooperation in this field, it faces severing limitations 
by its current low funding. EDA’s available funds were expended from ~€20 million (2005) to 
~€30-31 million (since 2010 up to date). However, since most of EDA’s budget is spent on the 
personnel, from €7,45 million to €17,70 million; EDA can only allocate €2,49-7,37 million for 
                                                             
4 Due to the low quality of the original figure, I decided to recreate it. 
research projects and studies (European Defence Agency [EDA], 2008; EDA, 2016), which 
definitely not qualifies as adequate budget for such an important task. Therefore, it is not a 
surprise that they have difficulties increasing the numbers of European collaborations. 
Increasing EDA’s relevance is blocked by certain MSs, especially the UK, whose aim is to keep 
the agency around as a meeting place for MSs on defence matters (Briani, 2013). 
A good example of the poorly made research investments and duplication in Europe is 
the aviation industry. One the one hand, there were three separate European programmes to 
develop jet fighters, namely Gripen, Rafale and Eurofighter5, which all together cost €29,57 
billion and resulted in 1205 aircraft. On the other hand, the American JSF programme (which 
also involved some European countries) cost €19.34 billion and produced 3003 aircraft. 
Therefore, Europe produced 1789 aircraft fewer, which are also divided among three models, 
for €10,23 billion more than the US (Ballester, 2013). 
Ultimately, the budget and technological inefficiencies stem from the fragmentation of 
the European defence markets of which integration would be a crucial point of a closer 
European defence cooperation. While defence markets do not open up there will be twenty-
seven national command structures, and the forces will be trained separately and apply different 
national doctrines. Working jointly on the armament programmes and using the same 
equipment are the first steps towards creating interoperability between the European armies. 
 
4. CSDP in the Future 
4.1. Why Do We Need a Revised Defence Policy? What Is Ahead of Us? 
After the Second World War, while France, Britain and over all Europe lost their global 
power, America and Russia (in the form of USSR) emerged as the two new superpowers in the 
world. The era of Pax Britannica had ended, and Pax Americana took over which is still applies 
today. Eventually, the USSR fell leaving the US as the only superpower. For decades, the US 
has been following an interventionist doctrine by which it projected its presence everywhere in 
the world and promoted democracy with more or less success. What Europe felt from this is the 
American defence umbrella through NATO. For a long time, neither politicians nor voters have 
been considering defence policy important on their agenda, since they do not regard themselves 
being in direct military threat, which is the number one reason in defence policy. Because of 
this, like an unused muscle, the European militaries rapidly devolved. 
                                                             
5 Gripen was Swedish, Rafale was French and Eurofighter was a collaboration among Germany, France, Spain, 
Italy and the UK. 
However, the global balance and relations have changed. On the one hand, the US is 
slowly returning to its protectionist behaviour from the 1920s, which will not mean the end of 
Pax Americana, but it will surely leave its mark on the global situation. During the Obama 
administrations, the signs were visible already as for instance the US chose to lead from behind 
in the Libyan conflict in 2015. At the same time, President Trump built his campaign on 
protectionism with populist rhetoric which earned him the presidency. What is relevant for 
Europe is the cancellation of the TTIP6; Trump’s repeated scolding for European countries not 
spending 2% of their GDP on defence7 and calling NATO outdated. On the other hand, while 
the US influence is declining, other non-Western countries are gaining momentum. China is on 
the rise both economically and military making it the next potential superpower – if it is not 
one already. Its aggressive claims on the South China Sea shows that China has the ambitions 
to become one. At the same time, Russia is trying to gain back its power and influence on the 
European and global the stage openly and aggressively. A clear evidence of it the annexation 
of Crimea in 2014, or the Russian hacking and fake news interference during the 2016’s 
American president elections. Turkey, India and Saud-Arabia are spending unprecedented sums 
on their military. However, neither these countries, nor China are able to project global forces, 
but having widely different views than the liberal Western world, it makes harder for Europe to 
work together with these countries. 
Lastly, migration and terrorism emerged as a severe issue for Europe in 2015 which 
were poorly handled by both the MSs and the Union. None of which seem to be a one-time 
occurring problem. Firstly, Italy and other Southern MSs still face immense pressure from 
Africa and the Middle-East. This pressure eased after the EU-Turkey deal was made (2016) to 
stop the migration outside of the Union’s borders. Secondly, since 2014 a new form of 
terrorism, namely Jihadist, appeared in the Union, which are inevitably connected to the ISIS 
in the Middle-East. Numerous attacks have been carried out in France, Belgium, Germany and 
the UK with hundreds of casualties. Despite all the efforts of the MSs and the Union, they 
cannot fight an invisible enemy hiding among the Muslim minority. In both cases the same 
principle applies, i.e. the European solutions only treat the visible issues. Meanwhile, the root-
causes should be taken care of instead in Africa and the Middle-East. 
                                                             
6 TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) was a proposed free trade agreement between the EU and 
the US about which the negotiations stopped after Trump’s election. Moreover, Trump withdraw with an executive 
order from TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) which was an already signed free trade agreement between the US and 
countries in the Pacific region (such as Australia, Japan). 
7 The only exceptions are Britain, Greece, Poland and Estonia. 
Hence, one can rightly ask the question: where do these developments put Europe on 
the global stage? The Union and the States are drifting apart, the American hegemon seems to 
come to its end, and China is more and more active and independent. In contrast with American-
led globalism, a certain segmentation is occurring where everybody walks their own paths. In 
this changing world which is full of uncertainty and new defence challenges and where the 
Union and Europe cannot count on the support of the US as much as it used to. Also, as some 
MSs had realised already defence is not about strict territorial defence anymore, but dealing 
with external and internal risks and threats as well. Therefore, security on every level is 
something that deserves more attention and cannot be mismanaged. 
 
4.2. Internal Developments and Britain’s Role in the Union 
The European integration has been gradually progressing to achieve more federalism 
since its conception in 1950. However, lately, the Europhobe voices strengthened in Eastern, 
Southern Europe and the UK criticising the Union for its monetary, political and decision-
making problems. These criticisms are more than well-founded, but they overlook one 
important factor. At the moment, the Union is in a stage of integration where it is not a fully-
fledged federation, but it is more than a mere intergovernmental institution. The Union is more 
of a federation than the Europhobes, Intergovernmentalists or Atlanticists would admit. 
However, being a supranational institution composed of twenty-eight MSs with growing 
competencies of a federation, but not being a federation leads to tensions and problems which 
cannot be maintained for a long time. At this point, the issues can be solved either by reversing 
the European project to some extent or pushing the integration forward with a consensus. 
Logically, more integration eventually has to involve the defence policy as well. It has 
been lagging behind for decades but has survived many fail attempts. Failing and retrying is an 
essential part of the European project, almost nothing has succeeded for the first time. For 
instance, similarities can be drawn between the progresses of defence policy and the monetary 
integration. The plans for a monetary union was already on the table in the 1970s in the form 
of the Werner Plan which inevitably failed. However, the European Monetary System with the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism followed, which were far from perfect, but it showed that MSs need 
some integration monetary-wise. Then, in the 1990s, under the direction of Jacques Delors, 
French President of the Commission, the European leaders established the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) in three stages, which concluded in the introduction of the common currency in 
2002. At the time, no individual European country was alone strong enough to survive the 
consistent speculation against their currency, which did not allow for ‘freedom’ of monetary 
policy. They realised that it was better to admit that they need to cooperation and integration to 
be stronger and continue the EMU, or each country will face immense consequences. The 
circumstances provided the adequate impetus, and the same logic applies to the defence policy. 
No individual European country is alone strong enough to carry out any major military 
operations, defend its borders, or in general face with the new challenges of the new century; 
thus, they do not have ‘freedom’ in security or defence policy. Immense security consequences 
can follow suit in the future if the MSs do not admit the necessity of more cooperation and 
integration in defence policy. This integration has been blocked by the UK for a long time, but 
with its exit from the Union it can catch up with the other developments. 
Indeed, the relevance of the ‘Brexit’ cannot be neglected regarding the European 
defence policy. On the one hand, the UK is one of the strongest members of the Union by being 
the fifth largest economy in the world and having the most prepared and competent military 
and security strategy – next to France. On the other hand, the British position has always been 
aiming to block or at least slow down the European integration. This goes back a long way, the 
British had preferred to stay out of the continental disputes and agreements, their only concern 
was to maintain the balance of power on the continent which allowed them to manage their 
empire without threats from the continent; but in the 1960s the UK applied two times for the 
membership of the EEC and also in 1973 when they could join finally. Their application was 
for the reasons that the UK’s global power dramatically declined, the EEC was economically 
successful, while the UK was not, the UK wished to influence the EEC policies and the UK 
feared to become excluded from Europe and its growth. Nonetheless, the UK has never given 
up on its initial behaviour and attempted to take a position where it is not fully integrated into 
the continental developments (the opt-out from the common currency8) and still can follow its 
ambitions as an empire, or global power at least. 
Naturally, this means that a federation-like integration of European militaries is a red 
line for the UK. Despite its military power, the UK ranks just the fifth as a contributor to the 
CSDP missions; it blocks the expenditure of EDA’s budget, it vetoed the establishment of the 
military HQ in Brussels (Institute for Government, 2017) and it actively promotes the three Ds 
principle. However, all of these obstacles will be removed as soon as the UK officially left the 
Union. Surely, the UK is not the only MSs that more or less rigorously has been obstructing the 
integration on defence matters, but with the UK gone the less powerful MSs cannot exert 
enough power anymore to continue to do so. 
                                                             
8 Along with Denmark and Sweden. 
 4.3. What Might Be the Way Forward for Europe and the CSDP? 
With the populist induced Brexit and the populist Trump’s election as President shook the 
Union which is increasingly left alone in a more insecure global environment. However, the 
people of Europe and the MSs are reacting to these developments. While many prophesied the 
populist victories during the European elections in the Netherlands and France, these 
predictions were false. Geert Wilders did not repeat Trump’s performance, and France elected 
Emmanuel Macron as President who is a strong supporter of the pro-European movement and 
promised to revive the Franco-German motor and kickstart the European project again with 
numerous reforms. 
However, how all this translates to the level of CSDP? Since the Second World War 
Europe had enjoyed the protection of the American hegemon and defence umbrella and could 
put its security on the bottom of its agenda. However, the Union must face with new 
circumstances that are occurring globally and locally, such as the loss of security by the 
American protectionist turn, China, Russia and other Eastern powers’ rise, migration, terrorism 
and Brexit. These circumstances also come with the hard realisation of that Europe is not 
independent security- and defence-wise and cannot neglect that fact anymore. 
Whereas upgrading every MSs militaries is virtually impossible both economically and 
politically, increasing the cooperation and integration of the CSDP is a viable way under the 
direction of Germany and France. What is more, the Benelux countries, Italy, Spain, Poland 
and Hungary are also supportive of the idea (European Commission, 2015). Even though MSs 
has been keen on rejecting the idea of the European defence integration for a long time; they 
cannot maintain much longer their stubborn stand on it, because the costs of the segmentation 
are gradually moving them to the direction of forced integration (Briani, 2013). 
However, how should this progress go? Clearly, it should start on the economic level 
and let so-called ‘spill-over’ effect exert its influence. Therefore, first and foremost, the 
integration should start with boosting the funds of EDA and opening up the European defence 
markets. By this EDA could harmonise the investments and collaborations of R&D and R&T 
programmes, and the Union could benefit from the economies of scale. Just these two steps 
would help the Union to harmonise the military equipment and manufacture more units while 
it would stop a lot of unnecessary spending and help to bolster up the interoperability between 
the national armies. 
Secondly, the decision-making process must be simplified for a more efficient and easily 
controllable European force. At the moment, decisions on CSDP are made by the Council and 
the European Parliament by unanimity (Legrand, 2017) which means initiatives can be easily 
blocked even by one MSs or the Parliament. Moreover, the CSDP’s mission planning is overly 
complicated with two stages of independent multi-level planning by various bodies, like 
Political and Security Committee, General Affairs and External Relations Council, EU Military 
Staff, Political and Security Committee and there is more (Mattelaer, 2008). The lengthy 
decision-making creates a situation where it is almost impossible to give a rapid reaction to a 
crisis. For this reason, the Battlegroups, which are theoretically deployable in two weeks, has 
never been used. If the MSs and the Union want to achieve a capable defence policy its decision-
making process much change, which will mean an aching loss of sovereignty, but a more secure 
Europe. While the Quality Majority Voting system showed that it works very well within the 
European Framework and makes decision-making much faster and smoother, it could also be 
applied to CSDP. 
Lastly, as once the armies are converging to each other in interoperability and on the 
technological and equipment level, it would make sense to create a new European security 
strategy that is contributed and, hopefully, endorsed by every MSs. Not developing national 
strategies could also push the integration forward. It is crucial to understand that the European 
security is deeply interconnected: if a crisis, for instance, hits the Southern MSs it will affect 
the Northern and Eastern MSs as well and vice versa. However, if not every MSs is on board 
with the integration of the European militaries, Article 42(6) TEU can be called upon, which 
states that: 
 
“Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which 
have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to 
the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation 
within the Union framework”. 
 
This allows for the willing MSs to start their integration while other MSs cannot hold 
them back. It is highly possible other MSs sooner or later would join this initiative. However, 
it has not happened yet (European Commission, 2015). 
 
5. Conclusion 
While the closer European defence cooperation and integration has always been struggling 
since the 1950s, the idea itself has never died even though many failures occurred along the 
way and Britain constantly blocked these initiatives. The most common argument against the 
European military integration is the loss of sovereignty which has solid foundations. However, 
the situation is much more complex which requires historical, political and economic 
approaches. The European defence integration faces three obstacles. Firstly, since the Second 
World War, the US provided the European security by its nuclear umbrella and unrivalled 
global army. Later on, the US tried to keep the integration down by the three Ds. At the same 
time, as security was not important for the European leaders and people, the European armies 
gradually dismantled and most of the MSs do not even have a capable security strategy. 
Moreover, the different MSs have different problems to face, France and the UK desperately 
wants to be able to project power outside of Europe, The Baltic and other Northern and Eastern 
countries see Russia as the biggest risk and threat to themselves and Europe, the Southern 
countries and struggling with migration crisis and Belgium, France, Germany and the UK has 
to face with an increasing number of terrorist attacks. At the same time, some MSs, for example, 
Austria, completely gave up on maintaining an army. Lastly, due to Article 346 TFEU, MSs 
refuse to open up their defence markets and prefer their own national military manufacturers. 
Also, they do not conduct joint R&D and R&T programmes. Consequently, they cannot benefit 
from the economies of scale, and European armies face interoperability issues, as each national 
army uses its own equipment. 
However, current global and local developments, such the American protectionist turn, 
Brexit and the rise of the Eastern powers, who spend an unprecedented amount of money on 
their militaries expansion and development, put the Union in a truly new position. As the 
American security umbrella is gone and one of the strongest economic and military power of 
the Union decided to leave, they are without any capable defence power. 
The question is how the Union will handle this situation. While the debate among 
Federationists and Intergovernmentalists on how the Union should function resurfaced 
regarding the European Army. However, the Union is further down on the road to become a 
fully-fledged federation than many would admit. Therefore, the only reasonable way forward 
seems to narrow the European defence integration which will not be easy, but if MSs wants to 
keep their security, they have to work jointly on the interconnected European defence and 
security. 
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